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The  bulk  of the  benefits  from  the  EC-92  Program,  and  the  greatest  impact  on the
developing  countries,  will  probably  not  come  from  marginal  changes  in  trade  flows
dependent  on  relatively  small  changes  In  prices  and  incomes;  nor  from  reductions
in average  costs,  a few changes  in market  structure,  the removal  of internal
barriers,  or a 5% increase  in EC output.  Those things  may be important  to
European  policy  makers,  but  they  are  rather  remote  from  the  developing  countries.
The  substantive  threats  to  developing  countries  arise  from  investment  diversion
and continued  external  barriers,  especially  non-tariff  barriers  of various
physical  and  administrative  kinds.
a)  Internal  Change:  The  EC  expects  higher  growth  and  lower  prices  within  the
European  economies  as a result  of EC-92,  because  firms  will be able to
exploit  comparative  advantages  and  economies  of  scale  more  effectively  and
because  competition  between  firms  will increase  (although  the last two
imply  a conflict  which  may  nullify  one  of them]. How  much  the  removal  of
internal  barriers  helps  the developing  countries  depends  on the relative
sizes  of the trade creation  and the trade diversion  effects.  The net
effect depends on the  income and price elasticities  of  developing
countries'  trade  with  the  EC.  Current  estimates  suggest  that  it  will  not
be large.
b)  Industrial  Structure  in  the  EC and  Commercial  Policy:  Competition  between
European firms is likely  to increase  because  the removal  of internal
bureaucratic  and trade barriers  will reduce collaborative  agreements
between firms.  But those gains  may not materialize  because firms  may
merge  or cooperate  in  order  to increase  their  market  share  and  strengthen
their competitive  position  vs. US or Japanese  firms.  If new external
barriers  emerge, or if national  restric-.ions  are replaced  by EC-wide
barriers,  EC firms  may  collaborate  more closely  with the large  US or
Japanese  firms,  just  as  they  have  done  within  Europe  to  circumvent  trading
restrictions.  None  of  these  consequences  will  benefit  developing  country
trade  in  manufactures  or services.
C)  Investment: EC-92  may lead  to  increased  investment  in EC countries  to
meet the extra  demand,  growth  or trade diversion. That investment  may
come  at  the expense  of investment  which  would  otherwise  be  undertaken  in
developing  countries. In that case,  their  future  production potential
will be diminished. Obviously  there is an issue  of investment  creation
versus investment  diversion,  but with given financial  resources,  tight
monetary  policies,  and developing  countries indebtedness,  it is likely
that investment  diversion  will  dominate. It  is  also  possible  that  US and
Japanese  firms,  fearing  higher  EC external  barriers  and local content
rules,  will establish  bases  within  the  EC.
d)  Non-tariff  Barriers/Subsides:  The  technical  standards  required  by EC-92
may in some cases  be  higher  than those  of some  member  countries. New
EC-wide standards  would therefore  hurt developing  country  exporters.
Similarly,  an increase  of  voluntary  exports  restraints,  a tightening  of
local  content  rules  or reciprocity  agreements,  and subsidies  for public
sector  enterprises  or for agricultural  prices  on the scale  seen so far
will  certainly  make  life  more  difficult  for  developing  country exporters.
e)  Maintaining/Raising  External  Barriers:  Is  "Fortress  Europe"  likely? The
EC Commission  says  no,  but  the  past  record  of  the  Community  on  this score
has  not  been  good. The  CAP  is  the  most  blatant  example  of protectionism,
but other  examples  are the "pyramid"  of preferential  trading  agreements
and  the  increasing use  of  non-tariff barriers againet  low-tech,
labor-intensive  developing  country exporters  or  high-tech  US  and  Japanese
exports. Yet  another  example  is  the  local  content  requirement.  All  these
suggest  that external  barriers  will remain, since there has been no
official  commitment  to their  removal.  The remaining  question  is then,will the  (average)  barriers  be raisel  to protect  the least efficient
producers  in the  EC and  to the level  of the highest  of the  preferential
trading  agreements? There  seems  to be a good zhance  that in converting
national  barriers  to  EC-wide  protection,  external  barriers  will  rise. If
so, it may only be by a small amount  since  a single  market  will force
Article  115 (which  limits  the  movement  of restricted  goods  between  member
countries)  to be  abandoned,  and  an  external  tariff  which  allows  efficient
producers  to profit from the protection  of tne less efficient  would
conflict  too obviously  with the stated  objective  of greater internal
competition.1. Introduction
Trade  Ministers  of the  GATT  countries  spent  much of late 1990  reviewing  their
multilateral  trading  arrangements  and  attempting  to  negotiate  new  reductions  in
the tariff  and  non-tariff  trade  barriers  between  them.  It was through  these
negotiations  that  the  leading  OECD  countries  hoped  to  fulfil  their  pledge  (first
made in 1983)  "to  halt and .......  reverse  protectionism". In the event,  the
negotiations  effectively  broke down amid accusations  of unfair subsidies  in
European  and  US  agriculture,  increasing  protectionist  barriers  against  textiles,
chemicals,  steel,  cars,  and  consumer  electronics  in "Fortress  Europe",  and  the
effects  of  t'nilate4al  restrictions  iadposed  by the  US against  dumping  or  limited
access  for  US exporters.
Far Zrom  bringing  the  promise  of reform,  trading  arrangements  such  as the  EC's
1992 program  have lowered  expectations  of what would eventually  be achieved
through  the  GATT  talks. They  have  revived  the  fear  that  the  liberal  multilateral
trading  system,  built  up since  the  war,  was degenerating  (de  facto,  if  not de
jure)  into  more  protectionist-minded  regional  trading  blocs. The  flavor  of  what
is to come for those outside, as well  as those inside, the European bloc  is
conveyed  very  well  by the following  three  quotes:
(1)  "In  the  world  race  against  the  clock,  which  the  countries  of Europe  have
to  win  to  survive,  what  was  needed  was  a  common objective  to  enable  us  to
look  beyond  the  everyday  difficulties  and  pool  our  strengths  and  energies.
That  is  why,  when  I  took  over  as  president  of  the  Commission  of  the
European  Communities,  I  proposed  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the Heads
of State  or Government  of the  Community  that  we should  create  by 1992  an
economic  area  where  all  barriers  have  been removed  and  the  principles  of
solidarity  are  applied". Jaques  Delors,  president  of the  EC Commission.
(2)  "We  are not  building  a Single  Market  in order  to turn it over to hungry
foreigners"  Willy de Clerq,  while  Commissioner  for  Foreign  Relations  in
the  EC (quoted  in  Hamilton,  1991).2
(3)  "The literature on  customs unions  is general, whether written by
free-traders  or  protectionists,  is  almost universally favorable to
themselves,  and  only  here  and  there  is  a  sceptical  note  to  be encountered,
usually  by an economist  with free-trade  tendencies.  It is a strange
phenomenon  which  unites  free-traders  and  protectionists  in the  field  of
commercial  policy"  (Viner,  1950).
By virtue  of its  EC-92  and  monetary  union  programs,  the  European  bloc  has  by
far the  most developed  and  comprehensive  integration  plans.  It is significant
therefore  that  two of these  quotes  come  from the European  policy  makers  most
closely  concerned  with the development  of those  two  programs. And the third
quote  clearly  reflects  the  experience  that  those  within  a  customs  union  usually
perceive  the advantages  very differently  from those outside,  whatever  their
interests  in the  matter.
The  possibility  of  North  American  and  East  Asian  trading  blocsl  may  also  lead  to
similar  attitudes  there,  but that (at  least  in the  judgement  of Schott,  1991)
seems  unlikely  for  several  reasons. First,  the  possible  East  Asian  bloc  is too
dispersed  and too diverse in terms of income  levels  and market structures.
Secondly,  its  external  trade  still  outweighs  its  withi-region trade  by 2 to 1,
so the incentives  to integrate  are  weak.  Thirdly,  East Asian trade is too
dependent  on access to US markets, which gives them a vested interest  in
supporting  the GATT system  as the best safeguard  of their trading  interests
across  bloc boundaries.  Although  the North  American  bloc is more cohesive
economically,  its  external  trade  is  1  times  the  within-block  trade;  and each
member  needs  to  de  something  to  cure  a  persistent  current  e.ccount  deficit.  Thus,
unless  significant  scope  can  be found  for  substituting  imports  domestically,  the
North  American  bloc  will  have to expand  its  exports  to  the  rest  of the  world.
That gives  it an incentive  to support  the  GATT trading  rights  and discipline.
In  practice  the  successful  conclusion  of  the  Uruguay  Round  remains  a  priority  and
the  North  American  trade  zone  has  been designed  to reinforce  the  existing  GATT
arrangements.3
The data  in Table  1 underline  the  relative  cohesiveness  of the  EC as a trading
bloc.  It therefore  makes  sense  to  look  at the  EC initiatives  as the  source  of
change  and  the  main threat  to  production  and  trade  in the  developing  countries.
Nevertheless,  by their  participation  in the  Uruguay  Round,  it is demonstraced
that  all the  main players  now recognize  that  protectionism  is on the  rise and
needs  to  be  reveraed. The  new  protectionism  is  different  however. Not  only  have
r.on-tariff  barriers, such as  technical and environmental  standards, been
increasingly  used,  but  also  protectionism  now  reflects  the  emergence  of trading
blocs,  as  agents,  in  place  of  individual  countries.  Unilateral  restrictions  have
developed  into  multilateral  ones. These  trading  arrangements,  and  the  potential
they  offer  for  increased  protectionism,  probably  have  more  profound  implications
for the developing  countries  and those outside the major blocs than the
breakdown  of the  GATT  negotiations. Indeed,  a new institutional  framework  is
already  emerging. The  United  States  has formed  a free  trade  zone  with Canada
(and  a  pact  with Mexico  is  under  negotiation).  Having  become  disillusioned  with
progress  under the Uruguay Round, and with the implementation  of earlier
agreements,  the  US  has  tended  to  pursue  a  more  aggressive  unilateral  trade  policy
in  certain  markets,  under  its  Omnibus  Trade  and  Competitiveness  Act.
The  European  Community  has  become  increasingly  immersed  in  its  EC-92  program,  the
logic  of  which  suggests  greater  barriers  will  be  needed  between  "Fortress  Europe"
and the rest of the  world in order to ensure  success  on the scale  foreseen.
Elsewhere,  countries  have  grouped  themselves  together  for  policy  purposes  and  in
defence  of their  special  regional  or sectoral  interests. Obvious  examples  of
this  are  the  ASEAN,  ACP,  or Latin  American  countries  (the  LAIA,  CACM,  MERCOSUR,
or  Andean  groups,  depending  on the  issue). Meanwhile,  sectoral  interestE  have
led  to the  emergence  of the  Cairns  group  in  the  current  GATT  negotiations.
Any tendency  towards  regional  (or sectoral)  trading  blocs  must raise serious
questions  about  the  economic  efficiency  and  welfare  implications  of the  system
that results,  and whether  free trade  is hindered  or enhanced.  In the EC-92
context,  the  main  questions  for  the  rest  of the  world  are:-4
a)  What  does  EC-92,  and  the  emergence  of  other  trading  blocs,  mean  for  world
trading  patterns  and for  the  developing  countries  in  particular?
b)  What are the implications  for trade in manufactures,  and how d& they
compare  with the likely  effects  of liberalising  agricultural  trade?
c)  Should  the  developing  countries regard  these  changes  as consistent  with
the GATT framework  and hence -ositive  in the sense of inducing  extra
growth  and investment?  Or should  they  regard  them  as a means  of denying
market  access  in order  to  protect  the least  efficient  industries  in the
OECD economies? Should  they  attempt  to form trading  blocs to similarly
provide  protection  for  their  own industries?
In  all  this  it  is  important  to  focus  on  whether  Europe'  s  commercial  policies  are
likely  to  prove  protectionist,  and  hence  damaging,  in  effect  rather  than  in  word.
2.  EC-92: General  Implicatior.3
The  completion  of  the  internal  market  in  Europe  entails  removing  all  the  barriers
to  trade  between  member  countries  of  the  EC. That  nearly  300  separate  directives
are  needed  to  achieve  this  gives  an idea  of the  scope  of the  legislative  changes
required to secure the free movement of  goods, services and  factors of
production.  Many  of the  changes  are  directed  at improving  market  access  for  EC
participants;  some are directed  at making  markets  function  more flexibly  (to
improve  competitiveness,  setting  standards,  or  establishing  pollution  controls);
and some are  concerned  with promoting greater competition  or to  exploit
comparative  advantage/economies  of  scale  in  EC  production.  These  directives  were
considered  necessary  because  the  EC had remained  a fragmented  market,  and  was
becoming  more rather  than  less  fragmented  with  different  national  controls  and
restraints  (especially  in  the  capital,  labor  and  services  markets)  and  differing
health  and  safety  standards.  To  meet  US  and  Japanese  competition,  it  was  argued,
European  firms  would need  to exploit  economies  of scale and establish  a
stronger  competitive  position.2_.  The Developmn  ogf  Pxices  and  Incomes  aftgr  EC-92
There  is broad agreement  among  analysts  that EC-92  will bring tenefits  to EC
countries  when all the directives  ar. implemented. There is very much less
agreement  on how large  those  benefits  are likely  to be and  how they  will be
distributed  over  member  countries  or regions. And there  even less  agreement  -
largely  because there  has been so little  analysis  of this question  - on how
strong  the  effects  on other  economies  (North  American,  East  Asian,  developing
countries  and East European)  would  be.  In fact there  is little  agreement  on
whether  the  net impacts  on the  outside  economies  will  be positive  or negative,
let  alone  what the  distribution  of the changes  will be across  the  OECD,  NICs,
developing  countries,  or East  Europe.
In general  terms,  the  EC countries  can  expect  higher  income  levels  and lower
prices as  internal  barriers to trade come down under the EC-92 program.
Increased  competition,  greater  efficiency  through  exploiting  economies  of  scale
and  the  wider  scope  for  investing  according  to  comparative  advantage,  removal  of
internal  customs  duties  and ocher transactions  costs,2  the removal  of price
discrimination,  competitive  tendering  for  government  contracts,  free  circulation
of goods from the cheapest  supplier,  a lower cost of capital through  more
efficient  (for  which read integrated)  financial  markets;  these  are  all things
which  will reduce  prices  within  the  EC.  Falling  prices  will of  course  expand
the  EC  markets  and  therefore  lead  to expanding  income  levels  (as  well  as  incomes
higher  in real  terms  because  prices  are  lower  than  otherwise). One  can  expect
this  to  have  a continuing  effect  through  increased  investment,  both in  response
to rising incom3s  and  the  lower  costs  of capital  (an  accelerator  argument,  in
the  absence  of risk  premia)  and  in order  to exploit  greater  efficiency  through
economies  of  sale  and  comparative  advantage  (again  without  risk  premia).  Foreign
producers  may  also  be tempted  to invest  in  the  EC  to  establish  a  base  within  the
union.rhert  may  be some  effects  which  will  work in  the  opposite  direction,  offsetting
the  price  falls  and income  gains. If  health  and  safety  standards  are  raised  to
the level  of the most stringent  within  the EC, or if polluwt-on  controls  are
tightened  everywhere,  then  industry's  costs  must  rise  everywhere.  Similarly  if
exter,oal  barriers  (tariffs,  quotas,  or  voluntary  restraints)  increase  while  the
internal  barriers  are  being  dismantled,  then  cheaper  external  susppliers  will  be
shut  out  and  prices  will rise.  It  may also  be that  firms  will form  cartels  or
make collusive  agreements  to overcome  competitive  pressures  and that  this  will
be condoned  by the  EC Commission  in  order  to  gain support  for  its  program  (and
there  have alrealy  been cases of this in activities  such as  airlines,  car
producers,  electronics,  banks,  and food products).  Non-EC imports  could  be
excluded  by using  aggressive  reciprocity  arguments  or aj.?lying  discriminatory
standards. Nevertheless,  those  countereffects  are  generally  thought  to  be small
in  scope. The  remaining  questions  are  then:  (i)  by  how  much  will  prices  fall  and
incomes  rise; (ii)  what proportion  of those  changes  will spill  over onto the
external  economies;  and (iii)  will  those  spillovers  be favorable  or  unfavorable
for  the  non-EC  economies?  The  empirical  evidence  on  the  first  question  i8  slight
and conflicting,  except  that  the  gains  in EC  variables  are  likely  to  be fairly
small. Optimistic  estimates  from  the  Cecchini  report  suggest  1X extra  GNP for
each of 5  years  and  a ½Z improvement  in the  EC's terms  of trade.
2.2  Trade  Creation  and  Trade  Diversion  in  Other  Countries
The  spillovers  onto  outside  economies  could  be  quite  large,  if  they  are  smaller
economies  dependent  on EC trade  - such  as the  Lom6  Convention  or East  European
countries. The two  determining  factors  here are the  proportion  of EC  trade
conducted  with third  countries  (at  present  a  bit  over  40%,  ranging  frcm  52%  for
the  UK and  Denmark  to 25%  for  the  Netherlands)  and  the  share  of exports  in the
third  country's  GDP.  The relevant  parameters  will therefore  be the  price  and
income  elasticities  of  third  country  exports  since  they  determine  the  amount  of
trad;  a.iversion  (exports  lost  as  EC  prices  fall  with  increasing  competitiveness),
and  the  amount  of  trade  creation  (exports  gained  as  EC incomes  rise  with  market7
expansion  and efficiency).  The  balance  between  these  two  eLfects  will largely
determine  whether  the  tradt  spillovers  are  positive  or negative  overall. Over
and  above  that  there  may  be a  terms  of  trade  effect  as  the  prices  of  imports  froi
tee EC fall and EC import  penetration  rises.  In that case,  import  price
elasticities  in non-EC  countries  may also play a role.  Indeed -,,ere  may be
offsetting  price  and income  etfects  in the  third  country  as the  domestic  price
index falls  with import  prices  and export  industrias  expand  towards  greater
economies  of  scale,  so incomes  may start  to rise  there  too. But  these  would  no
doubt  be secontd  order  effects.  Finally,  the  spillover  eff>-cs  may  be  complicated
if  EC-92  reduces  market  access,  tightens  local  content  requirements,  or raises
other  trade  barricrs  for  non-EC  producers.
2,1  Investment  Diversion
That  is  not  the  end  ot  the  spillover  story  however  since  investment  expenditures
are likely  to rise in the EC for  a variety  of reasons  noted  earlier  in this
section.  Once again this leads  to spillovers  which depend  on the extent  of
investment  creation  vs.  investment  diversion.  If  the  net  trade  effects  (creation
vs. diversion)  are  positive,  then  some  new investment  will  be induced  in third
countries  too. But  if  the  net  trade  effects  are  negative,  or  if  local  investment
funds  originate  in  the  EC, or if  they  originate  in  oti-er  OECD  countries  who  wish
to invest  in the post-1992  EC, then investment  will be diverted  from third
countries. In  fact,  any  increase  in  output  must  lead  to increased  investment  in
the EC, in response  to the  higher  rate  of return  there.  That in turn  must
divert  some investment  from the  rest  of the  world  which  sees  a higher  cost of
capital  from  the  increase  in  investment  demand  without  any  rise  in its  rate  of
return  on capital.
Investment  diversion  is  likely  to  have  a greater  impact  on  developing  countries
as their  output-linkages  to changes  in  EC output  are  smaller,  and  therefore  the
relative  change  in  output  will appear  greater. More important,  foreign  risk
capital  will be diverted  to the EC from the developing  countries,  impeding8
technology  transfer. On  the  other  hand it  is  possible  that  some  labor-intensive
investment,  and  investment  in  cheap-:  but  environmentally  unhealthy  technologies,
will  divert  to the developing  countries as economies  of scale and tighter
regulation  take  hold  in  the  EC. Nevertheless,  developing  countries  will  tend  to
be affected  adversely  because  much  of  the  increase  in  EC  output  will come  from
reduced  costs,  and  much  of  the  attraction  of  developing  countries  has  been  lower
production  costs rather than the size of their  markets.  So this point is
especially  relevant  for  manufacturing  economies.  Moreover,  investment  diversion
has dynamic  implications  because,  with low labor costs  being weakened  as an
investment  incentive,  the developing  countries'  productivity  and technical
capacity  will fall further  behind - lowering  their  competitiveness  and their
ability  to  attract  new  investment.  Falling  investment  means  falling  expenditures
and a lower  supply  capacity  later  on.
Diversion  could  result  from EC firms  choosing  to stay  home, other industrial
countries  switching  from  developing  countries,  or  developing  countries  themselves
investing  in  the  EC. The  potential  effects  are  particularly  important  for  Latin
America  and  South-East  and East  Asia  both  because  they  have  been the  principal
recipients  of  foreign  investment  and  because  they  have  industries  of  a  size  and
sophistication  that  compete  with  EC firms  for  investment  funds.
2.4  The Influence  of Commercial  Policy  on EC-92  Outcomes
Since  the  impact  of  EC-92  on the  non-EC  economies  depends  on  a trade-off  between
expansionary  (trade  creation)  and  contractionary  (trade  and  investment  diversion,
external  barriers)  elements,  we need to understand  the composition  of those
elements  in more detail  before  we can say  how the trade-off  will work out in
practice.  Two distinctions  matter  here: first,  betweeii  the consequences  of
removing  barriers  operating  on  prices/costs  vs. those  operating  on  quantities,
and  second,  between  the  case  where  the  reduction  of  trade  barriers  is  restricted
to intra-EC  trade  vs. the  case  where  liberalisation  affects  all  trade  (imports)
equally.9
Examples  of  barriers  operating  on  prices  are  import  duties;  price  discrimination,
market  segmentation,  local  cartels,  or discrimination  in government  contracts;
transactions  costs;  extra  testing  formslities;  and  barriers  to  economies  of  scale
or  comparative  advantage  in  production.  Capital  market  imperfections,  currency
transactions  costs,  risk  premia  or inadequate  financial  market  access,  would
have  the  same  effect  on investment.  Examples  of  quantity  barriers  are  obviously
import  quotas,  voluntary  trade  restrictions,  purchasing  agreements,  local  content
requirements  or  other  restrictions  preventing  economies  of  scale  being  realised,
and environmental  controls etc; and, for investment,  capital controls or
ownership  "cartels"  blocking  a free  market  in corporate  control. In fact  most
of the  EC-92  measures,  whether  operating  on  prices  or quantities,  are  designed
to improve  market  access  and  the  competitiveness  of EC firms  - through  greater
labor  and capital  mobility,  the free circulation  of goods internally,  better
market  structure  and  price  responses  (competition  policy),  and  larger R and  D
expenditures,  etc. These  measures  will  have  different  effects  on EC and  non-EC
firms,  so  they  must  potentially  cause  trade  diversion  rather  than  trade  creation
for  on-EC  firms. Meanwhile,  reduction  in  external  barriers  (quotas,  voluntary
restraints,  ccmmon external  tariffs,  standards)  would result only in trade
creation.  But it is not clear if these  external  barriers  will actually  be
reduced;  standards  may  be  harmonised  at  the  highest  level,  quotas  and  tariffs  may
be maintained  to allow the internal  changes a smoother  passage,  and price
supports  (above  world  prices)  on  such  fundamentals  as  agricultural  products,  coal
and  steel  which  already  operate  on an  EC-wide  basis  are  unlikely  to  change  much.
So it's  not  clear  how  much  trade  will  be created. Indeed  one  can  even  interpret
the opening  statement  by Delors  as meanirg that the purpose  of EC-92 is to
increase  the competitiveness  of EC companies  vs. non-EC companies,  not to
increase  competition  and  performance  within  Europe.10
2 5  The Scope  for  Trade  Creation  and  Trade  Diversion  After  EC-92
a)  The  effects  in  perfectly  competitive  markets:
Which markets are likely to be most affected  by  these developments?  The
traditional  trade  creation  - trade  diversion  analysis  assumes  perfect  competition
and segmented  markets  (i.e., no spillovers  between  markets). Together  those
assumptions  imply  prices  at marginal  costs  and  no spillover  gains into other
markets following the  removal of  barriers internally.  The  increased
competitiveness  would  then  equal  the sum  of the  barriers  removed  - said  to be
equivalent  to  about  1%-2X  of the  value  of internal  trade  for the  EC (Winters,
1991).  Certain  markets offer  greater  scope than that because  they are not
competitive  or  because  prices  are  fixed  by intervention,  investment  subsidies  or
stabilisation  schemes - for example agriculture,  coal, steel, textiles  and
possibly  cars and  certain  "high  tech'  manufacturing. Although  there is  ample
scope  for  re-orientating  and  increasing  trade  in  these  markets,  it  is  reasonable
to  assume  that  their  intervention  schemes  will  not  be  dismantled.  Certainly  that
has  been  the  impression  left  by  the  Uruguay  round  negotiations.  So,  except  for
imperfectly  competitive  markets  and investment  diversion,  EC-92 is likely  to
produce  few improvements  within  the  EC and  correspondingly  few  gains  or losses
for the  non-EC  economies.
b)  The effects  of investment  diversion:
Our  earlier  discussion  suggested  that  changes  in  investment  patterns  are  likely
to be a more important  consequence  of EC-92.  There is already  evidence  that
investment  flows  have  been  influenced  both  by  accelerator  effects  based  on  growth
expectations  and by a lower  cost of capital  resulting  from greater  financial
stability.  Stronger  influences  are  probably  the  desire  to  invest  where  there  is
(as  yet)  unexploited  comparative  advantage  or  economies  of  scale,  or  to  establish
plants  which  can  satisfy  local  content  restrictions.11
How  large  is  the  impact  of investment  diversion  likely  to be?  Imagine  two  firms
before  EC-92,  each  with  its  own  national  tariff. After  EC-92  the  more  efficient
of  the  two  will  capture  the  market  and  '.;he  other  will  vanish. The  more  efficient
firm will either  match world  prices or need an EC-wide  tariff;  had it been
capable  of  matching  world  prices  before,  it  would  have  done  so and  have  expanded
to its  optimal  size by exporting  what could  not  be sold  domestically  (Corden,
1972).  Hence  there  are  limits  to  the  EC-92  gains:  investment  designed  to  capture
economies  of  scale  or  comparative  advantage can  only  reduce  costs  to  the  extent
of  the  pre-1992  barriers. Had  there  been  greater  potential, it  would  have  been
exploited  before  EC-92. Hence  for  non-EC economies,  there  is  little  likelihood
that  the  EC's  import  competing  firms  will  suddenly  become exporting  firms. That
limits  trade  diversion  to eliminating  the EC's  existing  imports,  and probably
rather  less than that.  If the reduction  in intra-EC  trade,  due to barriers
within  the  EC,  amounts  to  about  1% to  21 of the  gross  value  of that  trade (the
estimate  in  Winters,  1991),  it  means  that  the  extent  to  which  new  investment  can
divert  trade  in those  markets  is still  only  1%-2X. That may not seem  a great
deal to the Europeans,  but for  a developing  country  or East European  economy
dependent  on a  few  export  markets  it  may  represent  a  substantial  loss  in  exactly
those  sectors  which  are  crucial  for  development  and  growth. And  we have  to  add
to it  the  possibility  of  aggregate  supply  changes: greater  efficiency  brings  EC
firms  closer  to the  optimal  production  size (Muller  and Owen,  1985). Average
industry  costs  will  then  fall,  expanding  the  size  of  the  market  - but  putting  yet
further  pressure  on the  external  producers.
c)  The effects  In Imperfectly  competltive  markets:
The  possibilities  for  re-orientating  trade  in  imperfectly  competitive  markets  are
much larger.  Here the less efficient  firms  in one EC market  may find their
domestic  market  share  shrinks  as lower  cost  producers  elsewhere  in  the  EC  move
in.  Such firms will get smaller  or even vanish.  However,  through price
discrimination  they may have nevertheless  been able to sell in other EC
countries  or in third  countries. It is  entirely  possible  that  they  might  then12
benefit from the opening  of other  EC markets  by expanding  towards  greater
economies  of  scale  in  a  way  that  was previously  blocked  by  the  fragmented  nature
of the  market  and certain  pre-1992  trade  barriers. In that  case,  EC-92  would
enable  them  to  reduce  costs,  survive  in  the  EC,  and  to  capture  more  of the  third
countries'  markets  through  their  increased  competitiveness  compared  to the  rest
of  the  World  (Smith  and  Venables,  1988).  Hence  imperfect  competition  carries  the
danger  that EC firms  may not onl,,  displace  third country  producers  from EC
markets,  but  also  start  exporting  into  the  corresponding  third  country  markets.
The  potential  effects  of EC-92  are  now  much larger:  not only trade  diversion,
equivalent  to  reducing  internal  trade  barriers  which  can  in  this  case be larger
than the l%-2X  we considered  before,  but also trade  reversals  (Norman,  1989).
Hence,  in imperfectly  competitive  markets,  the developing  countries  may have
something  significant  to  worry  about.
A number  of additional  points  need to be made.  One is that the existence  of
f ixed costs means that, as prices fall with lower barriers and increased
competition,  the  number  of firms  (or  at least  production  facilities)  will  start
to fall  and the  returns  to the  marginal  firm  start  to rise along  with larger
market  shares  for EC fi:cms.  But there  is no reason  to expect  the number  of
non-EC  suppliers  to  inctease.  Consequently  a  smaller  number  of  EC  suppliers  will
tend to reinforce  the imperfect  competition  characteristics  of the  market in
question,  reviving  profit  margins  while  reducing  costs  through  greater  scale
economies.  Indeed  models of oligopoly  relate  mark-ups  positively  to market
share. Thus if  EC  producers  gain  a  larger  share  of their  home (and  hence  world)
markets,  EC  export  prices  may  rise  which,  given  import  prices  are  falling,  leaves
the  non-EC  economies  with  worsening  terms  of  trade. Thus  EC-92  may  not  in  fact
have any strong  pro-competitive  effects.
Another  factor  is  that  EC-92  can  only  lead  to  less  market  segmentation  in  the  EC,
so the  pro-competitive  spillovers  from  one  market  onto  another  will  be larger
than  before. That  will  multiply  the  instances  of  falling  prices/costs  in  the  EC13
and  hence  of  trade  diversion.  However  all  this  has  assumed  an  elastic  supply  of
the  factors  of production  in the  EC.  If firms  run into  constraints,  possibly
local  ones as labor  fails  to be as mobile  as hoped,  costs  will start  to rise
faster. That  would  offset  some  of the  pressure  for  trade  diversion.
d)  The  effects  of  EC trade  polLcy:
All the changes  listed  so far are  market  effects,  but the impact  of EC-92 on
non-EC  economies  will obviously  be affected  by EC trade  policy.  And EC-92
necessarily  entails  changes  in  trade  policy,  although  what  those  changes  will  be
is an open question. For  example,  will national  import  quotas  be replaced  by
EC-wide  quotas? If  the  level  of  the  lowest  is  chosen,  trade  with  non-EC  partners
will  be  encouraged;  if  the  level  of the  highest  is  chosen  it  will  be suppressed.
But  even  if  an  unchanged  average  level  of quotas  is  chosen,  the  volume  of trade
with  non-EC  countries  will change  because,  in the  absence  of article  115, that
trade  will automatically  be redirected  with the previously  more restricted
markets  taking  more  non-EC  imports.3  If  those  more  restricted  markets  are  in  the
larger  economies  then the trade  will expand,  but if they are in the smaller
economies  it  will  contract.  The  same  set  of  questions  arise  with  the  application
of  health  and safety  standards,  and with the application  of voluntary  export
restraints.  Also  the  use  of  anti-dumping  policies,  discriminating  standards  or
voluntary  restraints,  or  the  aggressive  use  of reciprocity  and  tighter  rules  of
origin  cannot  be ruled  out. These  are  all  policy  responses  which  will  worsen  the
position  of the  developing  countries'  economies and, as such,  are anti-GATT.
They are unlike the changes  in the  previous  paragraphs  which are endogenous
changes  due to improved  competitiveness,  and  hence  not 'unfair'  in any  sense.
26  The  GATT as a Coogerative  Game and  the  EC's  Trade  Policy
Evidently  much depends  on what  we should  expect  from the  EC in terms  of trade
policy. Are  we  more  likely  to  get  Fortress  Europe  or  a  more  open  EC  after  1992?14
It is extremely  difficult  to 'second  guess"  the EC Commission's  responses  on
trade  policy. No clear  pronouncements  have been made  and, barring  warnings
about retaliation and the need for recipriocity, none are likely  that are
anti-free  trade.  Nevertheless  it  is  important  to  distinguish  policy  in  word  from
policy  in  practice. There  is  a  great  fragility  in  announced  policies  because  of
what  Gardner  (1969)  has  called  excessive  'legalism':  a  preference  for  "exalting
agreement  in form  over  agreement  in substance".  The  current  GATT  negotiations
provide  no pointers  for the longer  term:  having  been stalled  for a year, a
softening  of attitudes  "could"  yield  agreement  if the participants  so choose.
Similarly,  the EC Commission  is not a political  party  with a manifesto  and
established  ideology  which  might  guide  us.
So the only indicators  of what might  happen are the interests  of the EC's
constituency  and its track  record.  That, as Wolf (1987)  points out, makes
greater  protectionism  look  more  rather  than  less  likely. Wolf argues  that the
GATT's fragility, and  its lack of self-enforcing  controls by  individual
participants,  has  led the EC policy (among others) to weaken the whole
arrangement. That  has happened  because  of the  EC's increasing  preference  for
using  trade  policy  as an instrument  of its  foreign  policy,  as  well as a device
for  disguising  its  economic  weakness  or  delaying  uncomfortable  adjustments.  Wolf
argues  that  the  post-War  trading  system  has  been a cooperative  regime  in  which
there is  no advantage  in unilateral  liberalisation  - but there  are  advantages
(for  all) in  multilateral  liberalisation  so long a"-l  "play  the game". The
threat  of  discrimination  against  those  who  broke  ranks,  in  particular  denial  of
access  to  the  large  US  market,  sustained  this  process  of  liberalisation  for  many
years. But,  like  any  cooperative  regime,  there  is  in  fact  often  little  sanction
against  individuals  who  revert  to  their  best  noncooperative  policies  - and  quite
possibly  none  at  all  against  those  who  form  a  coalition  against  the  rest. First,
participants  may  judge  retaliation  to  be uncertain,  unreliable,  and  costly  for
the injured  party.  Second,  countries  may be reluctant  to incur  the costs  of
retaliation  against  dissidents  whose  unilateral  actions  do  not  much  affect  them.15
Similarly,  those  who  would  be  affected  will  be reluctant  to  afford  trade  benefits
to those  who, in their  own interests,  fail (or  have failed)  to  play the  game.
That in itself  will start  to  produce  coalition  groupings,  and  once there  are  2
or more larger  "players"  in operation  the  pressure  for freer  trade  will fade,
since  the  competitive  offering  of access  to the  coalitions'  markets  will secure
much  of  the  cooperative gains  for  most  participants,  while  reciprocal
discriminatory  trade  policies  will ensure  that free  trade  in a wider  sense  is
always  denied  to some  group(s). Indeed  it  is  quite  possible,  and  maybe  likely,
that  some  coalitions  will  form  which  can  secure  greater  benefits  for  its  members
than  would  have  been  possible  under  full  cooperation.  But  the  cost  of that  will
be  worse  outcomes  for  those  outside. Those  outsiders  may  then form  a coalition
in self-defence.
Viewed  from  this  perspective,  the  EC is  just  such  a  coalition  which  in  principle
rivals the US and Canada.  On that basis one should  expect it to follow
protectionist  policies  with  respect  to  nonmembers.  Whether  it  does  that  remains
to  be seen,  but  several  strands  in  its  EC-92/Monetary  Union  programs  already  show
a  tendency  to  move in  that  direction. The  EC  has  been reluctant  to  extend  most
favored  nation  status  to competitors  in certain  fields  (e.g.,  to East  European
or East Asian economies);  it has kept its  preference  areas (Lom6  convention
countries,  the  GSP  system);  it  has  used  commercial  policy  to  further  its  external
policy  (most  notably  in  the former  Soviet  Union  and  Yugoslavia);  and it  uses
commercial  policy  to further  its  aims of political  change  (e.g.,  to secure
agreement  on the  steps  to monetary  and  political  union). Once  again  one  would
have to conclude that the EC is likely to become more rather than less
protectionist. But  to go further  and  say  exactly  what form  that  protectionism
might  take  is  extremely  difficult  because  each  measure  has  differential  impacts
on the EC members  and  hence  damages  some as it  helps others. As a result  EC
trade  restrictions  are not systematic,  but reflect  a patchwork  of improvised
deals  and it would  be very hard to secure  agreement  on more than piecemeal
changes.  This  may in  part  explain  why  the  GATT  negotiations  have  stalled  in  the16
face  of  an  apparently  intransigent  EC  position,  while  some  commentators  are  able
to define  some  softening  in the  background. It  may also  explain  why the  EC is
able  to  maintain  a  reasonably  GATT-consistent  fa'-  to  the  world  while  operating
restrictions  which  have a  more protectionist  impact  in  practice. The standard
instruments  are  - agriculture excepted - tariffs (the GATT's preferred
instrument),  quotas,  voluntary  export  restraints,  and  nontariff  barriers  covering
health, technical  standards,  or environmental  protection.  The EC now uses
tariffs  very infrequently,  having  largely  removed  them  since  World  War II.  It
has also  been reluctant  to iipose  nontariff  barriers  except  in quite  specific
industries  where it can differentiate  the product in a  technical sense
(Greenaway  1991,  Wolf  1987). That  is  because  general  restrictions  of this  type
will  damage  most  member  states  while  helping  on]- oascific  states  or  industries.
It is far easier  to use quotas  and dumping  or  eort restraints  which can  be
targeted  rather  precisely  and which are otherwise  invisible.  Perhaps  more
important,  their  taxation,  redistribution  (or  subsidy)  and  rent  transfer  effects
are largely  invisible  both inside  and  outside  the  EC.4
Reducing  the general  barriers,  while  maintaining  and possibly  increasing  the
particular  (implicit?)  non-tariff  barriers,  therefore  allows  the  EC  to  retain  the
semblance  of  GATT - consistent  policies  in its  rhetoric  and  negotiations  while
achieving  rather  different  effects  in  practice. Not  that  such  a strategy  is  in
anyway  unfair,  but it  does  make it  extremely  difficult  to tell  whether  the  EC's
policies  are actually  GATT - consistent  or not.  After all some endogenously
improved  (and  hence fair)  competitiveness  may result  from a GATT - illegal
barrier: quotas on Japanase  cars may retain  enough economies  of scale for
European  producers  to  make  them  more  competitive  against  other  non-EC  producers.
But  none  of  this  gives  any  reason  for  supposing  that  the  EC  will  be lessening  the
protectionist  tenidency  of its  trade  policies.17
3.  EC-92  and  the  Developing  Countrie;
3.1  What the  Develogin-  Countries  Might  Fear
Which of the  preceding  arguments  matter  for the developing  countries? Until
recently  their  concern  about  EC-92  was  muted,  and it is easy to see  why.  The
overall  effects  on Europe  seem likely  to be quite  limited  and the impacts  on
developing economies  correspondingly  small. And as developing  countries  are
usually  seen  as suppliers  of inputs  to  the  industrial  countries,  rather  than  of
competing  products,  any gains  in the  EC should  also spillover  onto  them.
However,  we have identified  a number  of areas  where the developing  countries
could  encounter  significant  difficulties.  First,  nearly  all  the  analysi.s  on  the
subject  (and  the  EC  commission's  own  evaluation  in  particular  (Cecchini,  1988))
has  been  concerned  with the  trade  in goods,  whereas  one  of the  main effects  is
likely  to be investment  diversion.  Economic  development  in the developing
countries  is particularly  sensitive to  foreign canital and  investment.
Secondly,  what is small  to the  EC  may, depending  on the  shares  of trade  in  GDP
and the impact  of a foreign  exchange  constraint, be very important  to the
developing  countries. Here the EC's  rhetoric  is important. In 16 volumes  of
studies of the EC-92  program,  the Commission  made no more than one or two
parenthetical  references  to  the  rest  of  the  world. And  then  there  are  the  quotes
from Delors  and de Clerq  about  restricting  outsiders'  access  to any  benefits.
The  developing  countries are  also  painfully  aware  that  for  every  ECU  spent  on
aid, roughly  2 ECUs  are  spent  on restrictions  to  keep their  exports  out.5
Thirdly, LDCs are not exclusively  commodity  producers; trade has switched
substantially  to  manufactures,  especially  in Latin  America  and  the  Asian  NICs
or near-NICs.  Manufactures  are competitive  with EC products  and therefore
subject  to trade  diversion  which  might  well outweigh  any  trade  creation.
Fourthly,  the  LDCv  have already  seen  how  increasing  protection  can  damage  their
prospects not only in agriculture  and food products (e.g.,  coffee) where18
liberalisation  is  no  nearer,  but  also  in  textiles,  steel  and  light  manufacturing.
The  EC's  stubbornness  in  the  Uruguay  Round,  and  the  fact  that  East  Europe  was
able  to  secute  concessions  on  market  access  and  debt  which  were  denied  when  the
developing  countries  asked  for  them,  also  suggest  that  the  developing  countries
should  not  expect  any  concessions  to  help  offset  any  trade  diversion  that  may
occur.
Finally,  there  is  the  possibility  that  changing  market  structures  in  the  EC  could
significantly  affect  trade  volumes  and  direction  even  when  the  overall  price  and
income  effects  are  relatively  small.  That,  coupled  with  tighter  standards,  and
the aggressive  use  of  reciprocity,  anti-dumping,  or  local  content  rules,  more
than  offset  any  reductions  in  tariffs  and  non-tariff  barriers.
3.2  A Sectoral  Analysis
It  is  clear  from  these  remarks  that  the  consequences  of  EC-92  will  be  country,
or perhaps  country  group,  specific. We need  to distinguish  manufacturing
economies  from  commodity  producers;  as well  as distinguishing  countries  by
different  types  of  manufactures,  by  their  dependence  on  foreign  capital,  trade
in  services,  or  receipts  from  migrant  labor  etc.
a)  Trade  in  Manufactured  Goods:
While  the  removal  of  national  barriers  will  produce  both  trade  creation  and  trade
diversion  effects,  that  will only  be the  case if no new EC barriers  are
introduced  to replace  them.  However,  it is likely  that  new restraints
(Silbertson,  1989)  will  appear,  partly  to satisfy  the  pressure  groups  which
pressed  for  the  original  restraints,  but  mainly  on  the  argument  that  there  is  no
reason  why foreign  producers  should  benefit  as much as EC producers.
Transitional  arrangements  may  also  be  needed  to  allow  EC  producers  to  adjust  to
the  new  circumstances.  The  barriers  which,  if  retained,  would  be  important  to
developing  countries  producers  are those  on textiles  (the  M4PA),  clothing,
footwear,  light  manufactures,  consumer  electronics,  cars,  and  certain  commodities19
(bananas,  sugar,  coffee  etc). They  have  already  been  agreed  for  cars. Pressure
from  French  and  Italian  car  firms,  where  national  voluntary  export  restraints  are
now in  force,  led  to  an  EC-wide  r-straint  on  Japanese  cars  and  that  could  easily
be extended  to  Korean  or  Malaysian  cars. The  significance  of  this  should  not  be
underestimated;  cars  represent  a  symbolically  important  and  high  profile  sector.
Restraints  here  imply  an  important  precedent  for  "special  arrangements"  and  other
sectors  will surely  be tempted  to follc4  suit.  The Commission  may find it
convenient  to allow them to do so because that gives the Commission  direct
control  over trade  policy.
Of  course,  the  Commission  could  argue  that  the  arrangements  are  'transitional'.
This  is,  however,  precisely  the  argument  which  was  made  with  the  introduction  of
the Short Term Arrangement  on Cotton Textiles in 1961 and its subsequent
extension  into  the  MFA.  Thirty  years  later  these  restraints  still  exist. The
source  quotas  here  are  maintained  by Article  115  but that  could  be replaced  by
an EC-wide restraint.  And there is pressure  for some kind of transitional
arrangement,  especially  from the Southern  European  producers  who have gained
significantly  from  trade  diversion. As yet  no specific  arrangements  have  been
made,  since  the  MFA is an item in the  Uruguay  Round.  If,  as seems  likely,  an
agreement  is  reached  to  prolong  the  MFA,  this  could  be  used  by the  industry  to
argue for the  maintenance  of Article  115 restrictions  for the 'transitional'
period. Whereas  with  cars  the  principal  external  losers  would  be  just  one  or  two
countries,  in  the  case  of textiles  and  clothing  it  would  be a  wide  range  of  NICs
and  developing  countries.
b)  Trade  in  Services:
Services  is  a large  sector  (about  50%  of GDP in the  developing  countries and
more than that in the EC)  so EC-92  should  show  major effects  here.  But  most
services  output  is  not  tradeable,  so  few  of  these  changes  would  spillover  to the
developing countries.  The  three tradeable components  which will become
(significantly  more)  tradeable  within  the  EC  after  EC-92  are  financial  services,20
government  procurement,  and  transport  (in  addition  to  professional  services  and
telecommunications).  Messerlin  (1990)  provides  a useful  summary  of the EC's
policies  with  respect  to services.
Financial  services  have been a very fragmented  market in Europe and their
integration  would  be a  major  source  of  the  gains  from  EC-92. However  developing
countries  are  not  big  suppliers  of  financial  services,  and  the  opportunities  for
outsiders  to  profit  from  expansion  in  this  sector  may  be  very  limited  because  the
EC  Commission  has  given  clear  indications  that  it  will  enforce  aggressive  "mirror
image'  reciprocity  rules  for  market  access.  Since  the  provision  of financial
services  tends  to be structured  very differently  in other  countries,  this is
likely  to  shut  out  third  parties  (principally  the  US and  Japan). But  that  is  not
of great  interest  to the  developing  countries.
Government  procurement  contracts  is  another  area  which  is  potentially  lucrative
to  outsiders. The  Cec.'hini  Report  estimates  the  gains  from  greater  competition
in  this  area  to  be  worth  h%  of European GDP (EEC,  1988a),  and  there  is  no  doubt
that  the  internal  barriers  will  come  down. But  it is  not  at  all  clear  that  any
.tsiders  will benefit.  There will be excluded  sectors (water,  transport,
e.iergy)  where  developing  countries could  have  contributed.  Local  content  rules
may also  be applied,  with  non-EC  suppliers  having  to demonstrate  that 50% (or
more) of a  contract's  valae is locally supplied in order to qualify for
government  business.  That mav remove  the incentive  for developing  country
producers,  and  may  also  divert  investment  from  them  to  local  EC  plants. Finally
EC  governments  may,  as  in  financial  services,  demand  reciprocity  for  their  firms
before  opening  up access  to their  contracts. Nevertheless,  there  may still  be
some  benefits  for  the  LDCs  here.  Cheaper  and  better  aid  may  be available  when
it is tied, if the tie is changed to the EC as a whole rather than to a
particular  member  country. And  greater  competition  among  public  services  might
reduce  the  cost  of developing  countries  government  contracts.21
Removing  restrictions  on  transport  also  offers  the  prospect  of  considerable  gains
for  the  EC,  but  the  interests  of  outsiders  will  again  raise  issues  of  reciprocity
and  equal  access. This  issue  really  involves  airlines. It  is  not  clear  that  the
EC,  which  will take over the  negotiation  of routes  on a bilateral  basis,  will
want to relax  the  price  support  given  to the  national  carriers  or open  up the
already  fairly  extensive  transport  rights  within  the  EC  area  without  concessions
elsewhere.  Tourism offers the developing  countries  much better prospects,
however. For  many  countries  it  is  important  for  foreign  exchange  earnings  and
it  has  a rather  high income  elasticity.  Growth  in the  EC should  produce  strong
growth  in tourist  receipts.
c)  Standards:
Many of the fears  about  EC-92  concern  the  setting  of standards  because  non-EC
flrms  have  no control  over  that  process. Standards  could  be  manipulated  against
the interests of non-EC firms.  Greenaway (1991)  cites the case of high
definition  television,  where  no standards  have  been  agreed  yet.  Once  they  have
been agreed, the EC might set somewhat  different  standards  to suit its own
producers  and  to  place  other  producers at  a disadvantage.  Testing  could  also
be  complicated  which raises transactions  costs for outsiders.  That is
particularly  important  for  agricultural  food  and  health  products. In  principle
this  area of difficulty  could  apply  to  all  producers,  developing  countries  and
NICs  alike.
d)  Factors  of  Production:
Much has  been  made of the  advantages  of  having  mobile  factors  of production  so
that  economies  of scale  and  comparative  advantage  can  be fully  exploited  within
Europe.  The removal  of barriers  to the  mobility  of labor  and capital  (e.g.,
harmonising  qualifications  or social  security  arrangements,  removing  capital
controls,  etc)  is an essential  part of  EC-92. This issue  has two  implications
for developing  countries.  The first is the probability  of, and scope for,
diverting  investment  away  from  them. That  was  discussed  in detail  in  previous
sections.22
The second  concerns  magrant  labor.  The EC has traditionally  absorbed  large
numbers  of largely  unskilled  workers  from  the  North  and  West  African  countries,
East Africa,  Turkey,  and tho Indian  subcontinent, as a result  of an excess
demand  for  labor,  and  more  recently  as  refugees.  There  have  been  few  internal
barriers  for the past decade,  so new internal  migration  on any scale seems
unlikely. On the  other  hand  with the  regional  inequalities  in  unemployment  in
the EC becoming  stronger  with the advent  of a single  market (and  then single
currency),  the  pressure  for  internal  migration  will inevitably  grow.  As that
happens,  EC citizens  will presumably  get  priority  over  non-EC  migrants.  And
non-EC  migration  may become  more restrictive,  even if internal  migration is
avoided.  The  EC's migration rules will have  to be  harmonised.  That
harmonisation  may  well  be downwards  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  most  restrictive.
It  can  be  argued  that  this  is  already  happening  with  the  introduction  of  tighter
regulations  for  controlling  asylum  and immigration  because  certain  previously
liberal  countries  (e.g.,  Italy)  want to tighten  their  rules,  while  many other
countries  (especially  Germany)  fear  a  huge  excess  supply  of low  wage labor  from
East  Europe.  Indeed,  even  if  the  rules  are  tightened  significantly,  East  European
labor is likely to substitute  for developing  countries;  labor.  Thus the
developing  countries  stand  to suffer  losses  of  remittances  from their  migrank:
workers  which,  in  many cases,  are  a  vital  source  of foreign  exchange  and,  in  a
smaller  way, capital.
e)  Aid:
There are three issues  here: the general system  of preferences,  the Lomi
Convention,  and  aid  disbursements.  The  system  of  trading  preferences  is  already
severely  constrained  by quotas  and  the  general  reduction  of tariffs. The  EC-92
program is not intended  to change  that.  The Lom6 Convention  is intended  to
continue  as it is.  It has  a large  impact  perhaps  because  it deals  with a low
income  group  of countries,  heavily  dependent  on food exports  covered  by the
Common Agricultural  Policy.  As such it, and  the preference  system, may
eventually  be revised  downwards  as the  pressure  for  agricultural  liberalisation
mounts. But  that is  not  part  of EC-92.23
Direct  aid  disbursements  for  the  poorer  developing  countries  may  be affected  by
EC-92  in two  ways.  First,  as  noted  above,  aid  may  be tied  to the  EC as a  whole
rather  to  a  specific  country.  Donors  tie  aid  in  order  to  internalise  some  of  the
benefits,  so they are unlikely to give up the practice although  a smaller
proportion  of total  aid  might  be tied  in the future. But the  main gain  here
would  be the  ability  to choose  the  cheapest  supplier  within  the  EC,  raising  the
real  value  of  that  aid. On  the  other  hand,  the  completion  of  the  internal  market
will accentuato  the structural  adjustment  needs of the poorer,  declining  and
peripheral  regions  of the  EC.  Regional  inequalities  within  the  EC are  already
much  larger  than  within  any  of its  constituent  countries,  and  they  are  widening.
The  single  market  is  likely  to  accelerate  that  process.  There  is  also  increasing
pressure  to reduce  fiscal  deficits  in the EC countries.  It therefore  seems
inevitable  that a greater  proportion  of public  expenditure  will  be devoted  to
fiscal  transfers  and  structural  adjustment  programs  within  Europe.  On top  of
that,  monetary  union,  if  it  comes,  requires  greater  fiscal  activity  if  stability
is to  be maintained  in  the  real  sector  and  regional  divergencies  contained. It
is  hard to see  how all  this  can  occur  without  further  downward  pressure  on the
aid  budgets  for  the  developing  countries.
4.  Empirical  Estimates  of  the  Impact  of  EC-92  on  Developing  Country  and  World
Trade  Manufactures
There  are  very  few  empirical  studies  of the  trade  effects  of EC-92,  despite  the
fact  that  the  central  points  of trade  creation  vs. trade  diversion,  the  terms
of  trade effects, or  the impact of imperfect competition  and  investment
diversion,  are  essentially  empirical  questions.  The  little evidence  we  have  is
derived  from incomplete  "thumbnail  sketches'  of the likely  impacts  on certain
industries  or certain  variables. No analytically  rigorous  general  equilibrium
studies  of these  empirical  questions  have  been  published  - although  that  will
no doubt change  over the next few years.  This section tries to draw such
conclusions  as are possible from the rather scattered evidence currently
available.24
The EC's own analysis  of the effects  of EC-92 (EEC,  1988b)  emphasises  the
increase in  total output, resulting from traditional  trade creation and
consequent  efficiency  and  income  effects  within  the  EC itself. Later,  when  the
effects  on the rest of the world became  an issue,  this vas translated  into
increased  imports. But  of  course  there  are  also  going  to  be lower  prices  within
the EC, leading  to the trade  creation  vs. trade  diversion  trade-off. If the
relative costs between EC  and  other suppliers change, then applying a
conventional  income  elasticity,  without  allowing  for an unfavorable  relative
price  effect  on outside  suppliers,  is  not  correct. Further,  a  higher  estimate
for  the  income  effect  (or  finding  a dynamic  effect  on the  growth  rate,  not  just
the  level  effect)  causing  greater  external  trade  creation,  can  occur  only  if  the
initial  trade  effects  are  also  positive.
4 1  Trade  Creation  Outside  the  EC
If  the EC-92  program  has any impact,  it will be to raise  the level  of EC
income. This  was  calculated  by the  EC  at about  5%  over  5  years.6 That  implies
a  small  but plausible  figure  of roughly  1% on GDP each year.  Much the same
estimates  have  been  put  forward  for  the  gains  to  be expected  from  explicit  policy
coordination  in  Europe. [In  that  literature  such  gains  were,  by common  consent,
regarded  as worthwhile  but small]. Any conventional  import  elasticity  can  be
applied  to  this. If  developing  countries  are  assumed  to  be  balance-of-payments
or  demand  constrained,  a  reasonable  assumption  at  the  moment,  an  upper  limit  for
their  gains  can  be obtained. The  results  tend  to  be small  because  the  EC as a
block is a small  part of their  markets,  and tends to import  relatively  low
income-elasticity  goods.  Income effects are higher for the more advanced
exporters  of  manufacturers.  Given  the  low  shares  and  import  elasticities  in  the
EC and the  rather  high ones  of some developing  countries  the relationship  is
likely  to  be less  than  half  a  point  in  income  growth  for  every  extra  point  on  EC
growth,  and substantially  below  that  for  the  poorest.25
A standard  estimate  of the income  elasticity  of EC imports  would  be about  2,
implying  that  the  demand  for  non-EC  products  would  rise  by 10%  over  5  years,  or
2% each,  as a result  of EC-92.  That income  elasticity  estimate  would  not be
accepted  by all. Langhammer  (1990)  suggests  a figure  of 5.5 for developing
country  manufactures.  Goldsborough  and Zaidi (1986)  prefer  4.3 for the 'more
important"  developing  country  manufactures,  while  Bond (1987)  and  Matthews  and
McAleese  (1990)  report  income  elasticities  of  between  2.8  and  0.3  for the  EC's
various commodity (including  food, energy and mineral) imports.  Hence
elasticities  of around  2 seem  to  be a consensus  estimate  for  all  products,  and
that is the preferred value of both Winters (1991)  and Davenport (1990).
However,  this  range  of  estimates  does  suggest  that  the  trade  creation  effect  is
likely  to vary considerably  over different  product  groups  and over different
supplying  countries,  with NICs, low income  developing  countries  or commodity
producers  as  the  obvious  categories.  The  later  parts  of  this  section  will  attempt
more detailed  estimates  for the developing  countries  and for the trade in
manufactures.  In those individual  product  groups,  however, the additional
effects  of  EC  commercial  policies  (e.g.,  quotas  on  textiles;  voluntary  restraints
on consumer  electronics  and  cars;  domestic  agricultural  price  supports;  banana
preferences  or coffee  excise  taxes  etc),  will become increasingly  important.
Here  we  have  no information  on  the  average  impact  of  the  external  barriers  to  be
expected  after  EC-92.
4.2.  Trade  Diversion  Outside  the  EC
Here the  estimates  of the  price  effects  of EC-92  are  even  more  variable  across
product  groups,  and hence country  groups  (and authorsl).  Diversion  will be
greatest  for  low  value,  undifferentiated,  price  elastic  goods  such  as textiles,
clothing,  footwear,  leather,  consumer  products  and  simple  electronics,  metals  and
chemicals.  It  will  be lowest  for  non-competing  primary  goods  and  specialised
high-value  goods. In  other  words,  the  typical  NIC,  near  NIC, and  middle  income
(diversified)  developing  country stands  to  lose  its  export  trade  in  manufactures
to  EC  firms. But  the  commodity  producers  and  the  non-European  OECD  economies  are
likely  to  be relatively  unaffected  by trade  diversion.26
The  EC's  estimates  of trade  diversion  suggest  that  EC imports  would  fall  about
2½%  as a result  of removing  internal  barriers  to trade,  and  a further  7k%  as a
result of the removal of cost increasing  restrictions  (i.e.,  restrictions
preventing  scale economies  and full comparativa  advantage  in EC production
processes).7  On top  of this  the  Cecchini  report  estimates  the  non-EC  countries
terms  of  trade  will  deteriorate  by about  ½%  (EEC,  1988a,b).  Thus  on the  EC's  own
estimates,  the trade creation  and trade  diversion  effects  on outsiders  will
roughly  cancel  out - leaving  the  non-EC  countries  marginally  worse  off  overall
because  of the  terms  of trade  effects  on  their  own imports. However,  with such
a variety  of estimated  price  and  income  elasticities  to choose  from,  different
authors  may come  up with alternative  estimates,  as they  certainly  will if they
look  at different  product  groups  or  producing  countries.  For  example  Davenport
(1990) arrives at  extremely similar conclusions for  developing country
manufactured  exports,  whereas,  as a result  of his larger income  elasticity
estimates, Langhammer  (1990)  argues  that  trade  creation  would  outweigh  trade
diversion  by a factor  of 4.
4.3  Investment  Diversion  Outside  the  EC
To complete  these  estimates  of the  effects  of  EC-92  on  outsiders  we need  to  have
some idea of  the size and  likely consequences  of  investment diversion.
Unfortunately  there  have  been  no  studies  to  guide  us on  those  questions,  but  the
effect  must  be to  worsen  the  developing  countries'  position  somewhat  further  -
even  if it  does  not  have the  same  impact  on the  developed  non-EC  countries. It
may  quite  possibly  worsen  the  developing  countries'  position  by enough  to turn
a marginal  loss  as a result  of EC-92  into  a significant  one.
4.4  Trade  Creation  and  Diversion  in Imperfectly  Competitive  Markets
The remaining  extension  is to consider  the gains and losses in imperfectly
competitive  markets.  Our  earlier  discussion  suggested  that  imperfect  competition
pre-1992  would  exaggerate  the  gains  (and  losses)  because  the  trade  reorientation
element  would  be larger,  perhaps  even  to  the  extent  of  converting  trade  diversion27
into  a trade  reversal. Smith  and  Venables  (1988)  explore  this  possibility  in  a
ten  industry  model  and  find  that  EC-92  would,  for  those  industries,  raise  both
within  EC trade  and  EC exports  to the  rest  of the  world,  while  also  reducing  EC
imports  and  raising  the  EC's  GDP.  How large  the changes  would  be varies  from
industry  to industry,  depending  on the production  structure  and degree of
imperfect  competition. Nevertheless,  Winters  (1991)  quotes  a typical  example
(office  equipment)  with  45%  extra  internal  trade,  but 26%  less  imports  into  the
EC and 6% greater  exports  from  the  EC.  That's  not going  to do the  developing
countries'  (or  other  non-EC  economies)  any  good  at all.  Even  stronger  results
may be obtained  in the more concentrated  industries  with larger  economies  of
scale,  and  with  greater  degrees  of  market  integration.  But  the  point  to  note  is
that  imperfect  competition  is  clearly  important;  it  does  exaggerate  the  effects
of  EC-92  on  outsiders,  causing  sharper  falls  in  EC imports  and  beginning  a trade
reversal in which the EC starts  to increase  its share of other countries'
markets.  The Cecchini  Report attempts  to extend these results to all the
industry  groups  in  the  EC  by calculating  ratios  of  the  gains  for  the  original  10
industries,  to those  from  the  general  analysis  of two  paragraphs  earlier  (EEC,
1988b). Then  classifying  all  industries  by scale  and  concentration  allows  those
ratios  to  be  multiplied  up or down  by the  relative  scale/concentration  indices.
Detailed  results  for  international  trade  are  not  given  but  they  must  increase  the
estimates  of  gains/losses  since  the  ratios  necessarily  all  exceed  unity. However
this  seems  to  be a  very  doubtful  basis  for  calculation  and  must  be treated  as  no
more than  a pointer  to the  likely  outcomes.
Many of the calculations  designed  to gauge  the empirical  impacts  of EC-92  on
different  industries  and countries  are, of necessity,  incomplete  and rather
approximate.  As a result the empirical  estimates  and their interpretation
offered  by  different  authors tend to vary rather  widely depending on the
definitions,  assumptions,  and  data  used. It  is  not  possible  within  the  scope  of
this  paper  to  examine  and  adjudicate  in  detail  between  these  different  estimates.
Instead  Table 2 summarises  the position  we have now reached,  combining  the28
theoretical  propositions  of section  2  with  the  empirical  evidence  of sections  4
and  5. Even  if  some  of  the  individual  empirical  estimates  lack  credibility,  the
signs  of  the  spillover  effects  of  EC-92  look  fairly  safe  on  both  theoretical  and
empirical  grounds.
4.5  Dissenting  Estimates:  Will  Anything  Significant  Happen  at all?
At this  point  it  is  probably  worth  pausing  to  consider  whether  EC-92  really  will
produce  the  increases  in  competitive  pressure,  scale ;%conomies,  and the  higher
growth  and  lowe-  prices  that  have  been  predicted.  That  nothing  at  all  may  happen
is  perhaps  an  extreme  view. But  there  are  arguments  which  suggest  that  removing
internal  barriers  may have much smaller  effects  than those  discussed  in the
official  publications.  Kay (1991)  points  out  that  removing  internal  barriers,
harmonizing  standards  and mutual  recognition,  or creating  simpler  financial
conditions  for exporting,  will  make exporting  and  multilateral  control  (i.e.,
mergers  and  acquisitions)  more  attractive  options.  Barriers,  on the  other  hand,
tend  to foster  collaboration  or the setting  up of plants  abroad  to get round
these  constraints.  And  the  empirical  evidence  over  the  period  1983-88  does  show
that mergers  and acquisitions  in the EC have increased  as market access  has
increased  (in the form of closer  integration). In fact during  that period,
collaborative/complementarity  agreements  have only been maintained  across  EC
boundaries  (i.e.  with the  US or Japan). Exactly  similar  evidence  can  be found
in  the  development  of the  US as an established  single  market.
Increased  merger  and  acquisition  activity,  with  the  remaining  firms  trying  to  go
it alone in the expanded  EC market, is bound to have some anti-competitive
consequences;  and it will certainly  ensure the continued  fragmentation  of
European  industry,  instead  of  promoting  greater  scale  economies  and  comparative
advantage  via a  fresh  burst  of EC-wide  investment.  Thus,  according  to  Kay,  the
EC Commission's  own  evidence  does  not support  its  own  arguments8,  nor  do these
arguments  seem to  be logically  correct. Hence  the  gains  in incomes  and  prices
may  well turn  out to  be  much smaller  than  advertised.29
Another dissenting  voice is Hamilton  (1991). Hamilton  argues  that the  price
effects  of  removing  national  import  quotas  and  the  internal  barriers  of  Article
115  will have little,  if any,  effect  on prices  within  the EC.  He also argues
that  any  increase  in  EC  income  levels  will  have  little  impact  on  many  developing
country  exporters  because the thousands  of voluntary  export  restraints  are
defined  in  volume  terms. Hence,  as  the  EC  economy  expands  those  restraints  will
bind tighter and transfer  larger  rents abroad.  Thus unless the voluntary
restraints  are  repealed,  and  that  seems  hardly  likely  at this  stage,  EC-92  will
have  only  a  small  effect  on  the  developing  countries  - and  a  considerably  smaller
effect  than  the  simple  estimates  based  on fixed  exogenous  restraints  (including
price  and  income  elasticities  estimated  on the  assumption  of fixed  restraints)
would suggest.  This is very much at variance  with the "official"  estimates
(Cecchini  1988,  Sapir  1990,  Winters  1988). Once  again  it is important  to note
these  arguments,  an.d  to  be prepared  to revise  one's  estimates  of the  impacts  of
EC-92  dow,a  rather  than  up.
5.  The  Impact  of  EC-92  on  Manufacturing  vs.  Commodity  Trade  in  the  Developing
Countries
5.1  Agregation Issues
Langhammer (1990)  points out that price and income elasticities  vary over
different  classes  of goods;  and  that,  in  practice,  the  elasticities  themselves
(as  well as the  product-by-product  differences  between  them)  tend  to rise  with
increasing disaggregation.  Similarly price  and  income elasticities for
individual  countries,  or  for  the  developing  countries  or  the  NICs  as  a  group  will
differ  from any estimates  for the non-EC  countries  taken  as a whole due to
differences  in economic  structure,  trade  patterns  and  economic  policies.
Naturally  enough  that  means that,  although  all  the  arguments  above  stand,  the
general  estimates  of the trade  creating  vs. trade  diverting  effects  of EC-92
given  above  may  be  of  limited  interest  to  policy  makers  concerned  with  particular
cases. A country-by-country  analysis  which  takes  into  account  the  trade  pattern30
of  each  is  not  possible  here. Similarly,  a  detailed  product-by-product  breakdown
is not possible.  Such detailed  information  might only be of limited  value
because  restrictions  on  what  can  actually  be  computed  in  this  context  inevitably
means many of the interactions  between neighbouring  product  markets,  or the
price-income  linkages  oetween  different  countries,  will  be ignored.
Thus  one  can  either  have  a series  of  very  partial  equilibrium  studies  at  a level
of some  disaggregation,  or a general  equilibrium  analysis  at a high level  of
aggregation. At this stage  general  equilibrium  analysis  of EC-92 is in its
infancy,  and  has  only  been  undertaken  for  some  EFTA  countries  and  for  Japan  and
some  Asian  NICs (Haarland  1991,  and  Stoeckel  et  al  1990). On the  other  hand,  it
is possible  to give some broad estimates  of the likely  effects  of EC-92 on
product  groups  such  as  manufactures,  primary  commodities,  services,  or  on  certain
country  groups  such  as  Asian  NICs,  OPEC,  ASEAN  or  ACP, Subsaharan  Africa,  Latin
America etc, based on  the usual partial equilibrium/estimated  elasticity
approach. Papers  which  give  disaggregated  results  of that  kind are  Davenport
(1990),  Davenport  and  Page  (1990),  Page  (1991),  Langhammer  (1990),  Matthews  and
McAleese  (1990),  Nicolaides  (1990)  and  Stevens  (1990). The partial  nature  of
such  an approach  may not  be too  restrictive  if the  product  groups  are  chosen  to
fit  with the  usual  separability  patterns  of demand  systems;  but for  the  country
groups  it  may  be worse  because  they  tend  to  have  overlapping  trading  patterns,
or to  be linked  to the  EC or the  same  EC trading  partners  via trade  or capital
markets. This section  now summarises  those  results  in  so far  as they  refer  to
developing countries (or developing  country groups) and to the  trade in
manufactures.
5.2  Trade  Patterns  after  EC-92
The EC is predominantly  an importer  of primary  rather  than  manufactured  goods
from developing  countries.  The trade creation  and trade diversion  effects
suggested  by  our  earlier  arguments,  and  confirmed  in  the  empirical  results  quoted
below,  will  reinforce  this  pattern  with  an  additional  bias  against  the  lower  end
of manufactures  which traditionally  comes from the middle income  developing
countries  and  near-NICs.  The manufacturing  sector  may well have higher  than31
average  income  elasticities,  as Langhammer  claims,  but the relatively  simple
developing  country  manufacturing  exports (textiles,  clothing,  food products,
consumer  products,  chemicals,  steel  etc) also  have higher  price elasticities.
Moreover,  there  is likely  to  be increased  competition  from  aggressive  NIC-type
industries  in Southern  Europe.  So a significant  expansion  of the trade in
developing  country  manufactures  is  not  likely,  and  trade  diversion  will  tend  to
offset  any trade  creation.  Conversely,  the income  elasticities  for primary
commodity  exports  may be smaller  than those  for  manufactures. But the price
elasticities  are in  most cases  smaller  still. Consequently,  trade  creation  is
more  likely  to  dominate  any  diversion  here. Hence,  existing  trade  patterns  will
be reinforced;  and the  effect will be to obstruct  those  developing  countries
which  are  making  a  serious  attempt  to  diversify  away  from  a  dependence  on  one  or
two commodity  markets, especially  if their strategy is to diversify into
manufacturing  industries. It will also make things  more difficult  for those
Latin  American  and  Asian  countries  which  are  trying  to diversify  away  from too
great  a dependence  on the  US (or  Japanese)  markets.  And the EC's  preference
system  will  also  deter  any  diversification  of  the  poorest  African  countries  away
from  their  heavy  dependence  on  particular  EC  markets.
J.1  The Inmact of EC-92 on DeveloRine  Countries Manufacturing  Output by
Country  Groups
If  EC-92  reinforces  existing  trading  patterns,  how  are  the  developing  economies
likely  to fare?  Table  3, which  is taken  from  Page (1991),  gives  some typical
estimates  by country grouping.  The main feature is that, just as in the
aggregate  results  quoted  above,  the total  effects  of EC-92  on any developing
country  grouping  is  extremely  small. Positive  trade  creation  effects  are  offset
by negative  trade diversion  figures,  so that not one of the  group's total
exports  is changed  by more than  1X.  Of course  the  impact  on exports  to the  EC
itself  is rather  larger;  6X down  for  the  NICs,  41 up for  OPEC,  and  rather  less
for  the  others. But  those  figures  are  also  remarkable  for  being  so  small  against
a background  where  year-on-year  changes  in exports  of 10-201  are commonplace.32
Very small  price  elasticities  for  primary  com-iodities  an3  fuels  ensure  that  the
trade  diversion  effects  are  all  felt  in  the  manufacturing  sector. Our  conjecture
that EC-92 will serve to reinforce existing trade patterns is therefore
confirmed;  trade  creation  expands  the  EC's  imports  of primary  commodities,  but
trade  diversion  outweighs  trade  creation  in  manufactures  in  every  case.  Thus:
a)  Trade  in  manufactured  goods  will  be dampened  by EC-92  in all  developing
country  groups,  making  their attempts  to diversify  more difficult  and
reinforcing  their dependence  on prices in a few international  primary
commodity  markets.
b)  Despite EC-92 having a positive  but very small effect on developing
countries  as a  whole,  the  ga'ns  are  very  unevenly  distributed.  Commodity
dependent  economies,  such  as  the  ACP and  OPEC  countries,  gain  on  average.
But  those  with  significant  manufacturing  activities,  principally  the  Asian
NICs and  ASEAN  economies,  lose  out  by almost  as  much as the  others  gain.
Africa  and  Latin  America  are  largely  unaffected.
c)  The  net effects  of EC-92  on output  and trade  in the  developing  countries
is likely  to be quite small  (0.3X  of total  exports). The  more serious
effects  lie  in the increased  obstructions  to diversification  and in the
problems  caused  by investment  diversion. Damage  here  would  have serious
long  term  consequences,  but  no quantification  of that  has  been  undertaken.
The income  elasticities  underlying  Table  3  are  between  0.5  and  0.7  for  non-fuel
primary  commodities,  1.2  for  fuels,  and  around  2 for  manufactures  (but  2.4  for
machinery  and  transport)  (Page,  1991). Price  elasticities  are  effectively  zero
for  primary  commodities  as a group  (intercommodity  substitution  between  thesei
developing  country  groups  being  negligible).  They  are  around  5  for  chemicals,
machinery  and transport  (being  highly  substitutable  by EC products)  and 2 for
other  (simpler)  manufactures  which  are  less  easily  substituted.  Such  estimates
fit into  the  range  of figures  preferred  by  most authors  looking  at the  pattern
of overall  EC trade;  see Winters (1991),  Davenport (1990),  Cecchini (1988),
Matthews  and  McAleese  (1990)  and  so  on. However  there  have  been  other  estimates.
Langhammer  (1990)  prefers  an income  elasticity  of 5.5 for de-eloping  country
manufactured  exports  to the EC and +1.7 for the EC's relative  price.  With a33
higher income and lower price elasticity,  Langhammer  concludes that trade
creation  will outweigh  trade  diversion  by a factor  of 4.  On that  basis, the
results  in Table 3 would be reversed  and the developing  countries  would be
gainers  from EC-92 on all counts  - including  diversification  and investment.
However it is difficult  to give credit to these estimates  as there is no
explanation  why the income  elasticity  should  be so much higher  than in other
studies.  In a wide ranging survey,  Goldstein  and Khan (1985)  find income
elasticities of  1-2.5 for  different categories of  manufactured imports.
Moreover,  the price elasticity  has the wrong sign (implying  that falling  EC
prices  would  divert  trade  towards  the  developing  countries)  and  is  statistically
insignificant.  A  positive  price  elasticity  might  be appropriate  if  the  existing
national  quotas  are  abolished  instead  of  being  translated  into  EC-wide  quotas.
Since that is a theoretical  possibility,  if extremely  unlikely,  one should
perhaps note this dissenting  estimate  in passing.  However  Langhammer  also
acknowledges  that  the  impacts  of  EC-92  on  developing  country  manufactures  is  not
likely to be  dramatic and  notes  that EC  imports of  developing country
manufactures  have  actually  been  falling  in  comparison  to  US imports  of the  same
throughout  the  period  of  greater  integration  and  liberalisation  of the  European
markets  (1968-85).  Both  of  those  observations  support  Table  3's  estimates  rather
than  the  alternativ3s.
Davenport's  (1990)  analysis  of EC-92  and developing  country  manufactures  is
another  study  which  concludes  that  the  effects  on the  developing  countries  will
be relatively  minor  bf.cause  there  is  a rough  balance  be.ween  trade  creation  and
trade  diversion  and  because  the  changes  within  Europe  will  not  be large  enough
to  have a  big impact  (despite  elasticities  greater  than  unity). Most countries
in  his  sample  of  18  Asian  or  Latin  American  developing  countries  show  small  gains
in certain industries  (e.g.,  textiles),  but those gains are  substantially
smaller  than  the  average  annual  growth  of  5%-7%  experienced  over  the  past  decade.
But  much greater  negative  effects  are  to  be expected  from  investment  diversion
and from either  a tightening  of the  existing  national  import  quotas/voluntary34
restraints;  or even  from  an  extension  of those  restrictions  to  an  EC-wide  basis,
since  the  current  practice  of  transferring  unused  quotas  from  one  national  import
market  to  another  would  have to cease. Calculations  for textiles  suggest  that
developing  country exports to the EC would expand  by only a fifth of the
potential  expansion  implied  by EC-92's  trade  creation. One  may expect  further
quota  restrictions  on consumer  electronics  (to  safeguard  Europe's  "high  tech"
potential),  footwear,  household  goods  and  cars  since  investigations  of the  EC's
vulnerability  in these  markets are already  underway  or complete.  Davenport
argues  that  these  are  likely  to involve  EC-wide  voluntary  restraints  which  lie
oStside  the scope  of EC-92.  And on investment  diversion  no figures  are, as
usual,  forthcoming.
5.4  The Impact  of EC-92  on Commodity  Producers
Finally,  Matthews  and  McAleese  (1990),  in  their  study  of  the  effects  of  EC-92  on
primary  commodity  producers,  provide  further  evidence  to support  the  estimates
in  Table  3. They  put  the  growth  effect  across  four  commodity  groups  at  an  extra
6% of exports  to  the  EC,  or an extra  1.2%  of  total  exports. To this  the  change
in the terms  of trade  would  add another  0.1%  on total  exports.  But of the
estimated  total  increase  of 1.3%  in total  exports,  just  cne  quarter  would  go to
non-oil  producers  and  three-quarters  to the  oil  countries.  And  of that  one
quarter  share,  most (two  thirds)  goes  to food  and  beverages.  So the  minerals
producers  see  very little  benefit. Thus the  effects  here  continue  to  be small
and  poorly  distributed  across  different  product  groups  and  different  commodity
producers. And as  noted  earlier,  the  price  effects  are  very small  compared  to
the income  effects,  but the  net outcome  is  at least  positive  in each  case.
Matthews  and McAleese  also point out that the fiso-al  regime,  more than the
agricultural  supports  within the CAP, will have a big impact  on commodity
producers.  One  problem  here  is  the  harmonisation  of  the  VAT  between  EC  members.
That  will raise  EC  taxes  on food  imports  since  food  is  zero-rated  in  some  member
countries. Secondly,  there  are  sharp  excise  taxes  on coffee  in  Germany,  Italy35
and Denmark,  plus a system  of preferences  and quotas  for other  products.
Technical  and  health  standards  on  food  products  are  also  important.  Finally,  the
CAP  has  a  whole  range  of  price  supports  which  distort  trade  in  foodstuffs.  As
always  it  is  not  clear  what  will  happen  to  these  items,  but it  seems  rather
unlikely  that  the  existing  taxes  and  restrictions  will  be lowered. So tne
estimates  above,  and  in  Table  3 in  particular,  are  likely  to  be  a reasonable
picture  of  the  effects  of  EC-92  on  different  groups  of  commodity  producers.36
Footnotes
1.  Consisting  of the  US, Canada  and Mexico; and of Australia,  Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Japan,  Korea, Malaysia, New  Zealand,  the  Philippines,
Singapore,  Taiwan  Province  of China  and  Thailand  (i.e.,  the  Asia-Pacific
Economic  Cooperation  initiative,  plus Hong Kong and Taiwan  Province  of
China)  respectively.
2.  This in itself  is said  to  be worth  h% of the  EC's  GNP (Greenaway,  1991)
3.  Recall  that  at present  Article  115 forbids  that  an item  whose import  is
subject to restrictions,  quotas or tariffs in one country, shall be
imported  in another  and then transferred  in through the unrestricted
internal  EC  market.
4.  Wolf (1987)  points  to  those  taxation  effects;  Hamilton  (1991)  focusses  on
the  gains  to non-EC  suppliers  from the  rent transfers  implied  by the  EC
quota  system.
5.  This  is  a figure  often  used  by the  media  when  reviewing  EC  aid  policy. If
anything,  it  appears  to  be  an  underestimate.  Greenaway  (1991)  sets  direct
aid  expenditures  by EC countries  at  between  0.05%  of  GNP for  Ireland  and
0.4% of GNP for the Netherlands. The EC average  is around j%  of GNP.
Meanwhile  EC trade  with the  developing  countries as a whole  amounts  to
3.4%  of  EC GNP  (European  Economy,  No.42,  1989). Hence  to spend  2 ECUs  on
keeping  developing  countries'  imports  out for every ECU spent in aid
would  involve  trade  barriers  amounting  to  h% EC  GNP,  or the  equivalent  of
a  14.3% tariff on  developing  country import prices.  But  the the
agricultural  policies  of the EC countries (as part of the OECD) are
estimated  to  have increased  agricultural  prices  in those  countries  by 70%
(Anderson  and  Tyers,  1990). Since  the  remaining  EC  trade  barriers  cost  up
to 2%  of that  trade  (Winters,  1991),  non-agricultural  developing  country
exports cannot suffer  less than the equivalent  of a tariff of 2% -
actually  much nore  because  trade  in  textiles,  clothing,  footwear,  consumer
electronics  etc  are  subject  to much  sharper  restrictions  than that. The
share  of  agriculture  in  developing  country  production  is  approximately  18X
overall (World  Development  Report,  1989).  Based on those  figures the
average  tariff  equivalent  on exports  from  the  developing  countries  would
then  be 14.2%,  equalling  h% of EC GNP  or 2 ECUs  for  each  ECU  of aid.
6.  This estimate  must  be regarded  as  very tentative. Baldwin  (1989)  argues
it is too  small  by a factor  of 2.  But Peck (1989)  and Backhoven  (1990)
think  it is too  large  by a factor  of 2.  The EC's  preferred  estimate  is
therefore  a mid  point  and it is said  to incorporate  most of the dynamic
gains.
7.  Cawley  and  Davenport,  1988.
8.  The reason  for  this  is that  the  EC Commission  apparently  manipulated  its
survey  questions  and  made  selective  use  of the  results  to  get  the  evidence
it  quotes. A  wider  view  of  the  evidence  suggests  the  opposite  conclusions
(Kay,  1991).37
Table  I
The  Emerging  Trading  Blocs:  Export  Markets  ($bn)
1980  /  1986  %  1989  %
EC  Intra  Regional  369  48  451  49  678  52
North  America  47  6  85  9  101  8
East  Asia  26  3  36  4  66  5
ROW  322  42  343  38  456  35
North  America*  Intra  Regional  100  24  129  29  205  28
EC  68  16  59  13  100  14
East  Asia  52  12  59  13  116  15
ROW  205  48  195  44  304  42
East  Asia*  Intra  Regional  96  24  116  19  224  23
EC  42  If  59  9  100  11
North  America  68  17  153  24  207  22
ROW  187  48  298  48  418  44
So"rce: Schott  (1991)
S  =  USA,  Canada,  Mexico
=  Australia,  Hong  Kong,  Indonesia,  Japan?  Korea,  Malaysia,  New  Zealand,  The  Phillipines,
Singapore,  Taiwan,  Thailand
ROW  Rest  of the  World38
Table  2
A  Sunnory  of  the  Effects  to be  Expected  from  the 1992
Program  on  Non-EC  Economies
Developing  Manufactures
Non-EC  relative  to  exporters
relotive  to  non-EC  relative  to
EC  developed  primary
Individual  '1992'  Charses
Removing  Internal  Legal  Barriers  - 0
Removing  Country  Preferences  0  0  0
Transport  restrictions  - -
Ending  Border  Controls
Private  Services
Public  Procurement  ?  +  -
Standards  - 0
Total  Effects  on  Goods
Increased  Trade  from  Higher  Income  - +
Trade  Diversion:  competitive  markets  +-
Trade  Diversion:  imperfectly  competitive  markets  - -
Net  Effects:  competitive  markets  - ?  ?
Net  Effects:  imperfectly  competitive  markets  - ?  ?
Effects  on Investent
From  Structural  Changes  ?  +  +
From  Increased  Income
Effect  an Labor  -?
Adopted  and  extended  from  Page  (1991)39
Table  3
Estimates  of '1992'  Effects  on Dcveloping  Country
Exports  of  Goods  in  Constant  1987/8  Values
(million  Ecus)
Additional  exports  to  EC  Diversion  %  of  % of
effects  exports  total
Primary  Manufactures  (in  all  to  EC  exports
manufactures)
All  developing  countries  2804  4434  -5655  +1.5  +0.3
ACP  534  315  -477  +2.3  +1.0
Maghreb  countries  244  370  -534  +0.9  +0.5
South  Asia  &  China  86  920  -1125  -1.0  -0.1
Four  Asian  NiCs  12  2574  -4077  -6.1  -0.9
ASEAN  countries  102  344  -464  -0.3  -0.0
Western  Hemisphere  502  495  -751  +1.3  +0.3
OPEC  1156  515  -847  +3.8  +1.1
Source: Page.  199140
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